On the State of Coptic Activism in the Diaspora

In the Middle East Report’s recent summer issue, the Century Foundation’s Michael Hanna penned a lucid and insightful article expounding on the theme of Coptic activism in the diaspora and its implications for Christian-Muslim relations in Egypt. In a nutshell, Hanna argues that (in principle) the diaspora could—through organizational maturity, broadening of networks and contacts, inroads beyond traditional political allies, etc.— pressure Egypt’s government to uphold civil and political rights for all Egyptian citizens, regardless of religious orientation. In its current state, however, Coptic activism overseas has remained largely ineffective and has *possibly* eroded the credibility and position of Copts in Egypt (in no small part a product of the demagoguery of such personalities as Morris Sadek and Monir Dawoud).

This post is not at all intended to challenge Hanna’s thesis—which I generally agree with—but expand on certain points building up to his conclusion and offer some of my perspectives on the issue.         

Religious Fragmentation in the Egyptian Diaspora 

Hanna asserts that religious fragmentation in the Egyptian diaspora is an extension of societal trends in Egypt over the last few decades and—citing Samir Murqus— specifically a product of an “imported…sense of tribalism from the oil-rich Gulf.” While plausible, this explanation has not—to my knowledge—been substantiated by any serious academic study.

Moreover, it fails to consider the numerous ethnographic and sociological studies that underscore the centrality of religion in the life cycle of immigrant communities more generally. Religious identity among immigrants—regardless of country of origin—becomes more salient in the diaspora and provides them with a medium to express ethnic differences and construct identities.[1] Rebecca Kim, a professor of sociology at Pepperdine University, notes the interconnection between religion and ethnicity and argues that religious venues—such as the church, mosque, synagogue, and temple—help immigrants construct their ethnic identity, community, and adapt to new social environments.[2] Arguably, this condition applies to Egyptian immigrants no more or less than any other immigrant community.  

Moreover, the “highly segregated” nature of the diaspora should not be overstated. The same 2012 survey cited in Hanna’s piece reports that 70 percent of diaspora Copts felt they belonged to a broader Egyptian diaspora. In numerous instances, Egyptians in the diaspora—regardless of religious orientation—have collectively established cultural institutions celebrating and promoting their common ethnic heritage. Often times, Copts have assumed leadership roles in these organizations.   

For example, lawyer Maged Riad—the late Pope Shenouda’s legal counselor in the United States and owner of a successful Manhattan textile company—is the Chairman of the New York-based Egyptian American Community Foundation (EACF). Several past chairs of the Egyptian American Organization (EAO)—a California-based nonprofit organization aimed to mobilize the Egyptian-American community and preserve its cultural traditions—have been Copts, including Dr. Nagui Elyas and Cherif Youssef. Sarwat Fahmy and the late Azmy Tadros—founders of successful real estate, construction, and engineering firms in Northern California—were ex-presidents of the Egyptian American Society (EAS), a cultural foundation that promotes the interests of Egyptian-Americans in the San Francisco Bay Area. In addition, Copts populate and play active roles in the Egyptian American Cultural Association (EACA), Egyptian-American Rule of Law Association (EARL), the Association of Egyptian-American Scholars (AEAS), and the Egyptian American Society (EAS).

Diaspora Activism and its Relative Impact

Hanna notes that Coptic activist groups overseas have largely failed to pressure both the Egyptian and American governments on Coptic rights issues. These shortcomings, he goes on to argue, cannot be ascribed solely to the diaspora’s organizational immaturity, but other political and institutional impediments.    

I would argue that the inability to overcome these impediments is, to a great extent, precisely a product of the diaspora’s state of organizational and operational immaturity. Coptic activist groups in the diaspora can overcome many of these institutional challenges and maximize their leverage if they were—to be perfectly blunt—just able to get their act together.

Consider, for example, the following technical and operational deficiencies:  

• Coptic activist groups are divided and often endorse disparate agendas. For the most part, there is no unified vision or standardized approach to activism. Moreover, diaspora activism suffers from one-too-many self-appointed “leaders” and competing egos that all, unequivocally, claim to represent Coptic interests; 

• Observational and anecdotal evidence suggests that the vast majority of diaspora Copts are not members of activist organizations. Coptic activists have essentially failed to marshal the support, energies and financial resources of the broader diaspora;

• Related to the previous point, Coptic activist organizations in the United States are poorly funded. They are dwarfed, for example, when compared with established lobby groups such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA);[3] 

• The explicitly anti-Islamic posture of some of the diaspora’s most right-wing activists—such as Morris Sadek—alienate Copts in Egypt, Copts abroad, and prospective allies in the United States (including Muslim-Americans). Their demagoguery—as Hanna accurately highlights—undermines the legitimate demands and efforts of mainstream Coptic activists in the diaspora;  

• As Hanna notes, Coptic activists have failed to make durable inroads beyond their traditional allies (i.e., conservative circles). Diaspora activists must distance themselves from partisan politics and broaden their networks and contacts in both Egypt and the United States.

Copts as a Fifth Column

On a related note, diaspora Copts should eschew the likes of Nakoula B. Nakoula and Morris Sadek for the simple reason that their Islamophobic rhetoric is absolutely deplorable and counterproductive. Coptic activists abroad should not, however, temper their demands and efforts to achieve equal rights out of concern that militants—Islamist or other—will misrepresent their activities as serving the interests of foreign powers. Militant Islamists and others will demonize Coptic activism overseas no matter how rational, moderate or inclusionary it transpires. Coptic activists—be they in Egypt or in the diaspora—should not pander to militant Islamist sensibilities or function within their parameters of acceptability. Regrettably, Islamist groups have a long track record of invalidating Coptic grievances and incriminating Christians in Egypt—despite a two thousand year history of rejecting foreign patronage and intervention—of serving as a “fifth column.” It is doubtful that their position on this issue will change any time soon.   

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[1] Eds. Warner, Stephen and Wittner, Judith G.  Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998. 

[2] Kim, Rebecca Y. “Religion and Ethnicity: Theoretical Connections.”  Religions 2 (2011): 312-329, p. 312. 

[3] FindTheCompany.com and FindTheBest.com—websites that collect financial data on companies and non-profit organizations—disclose the annual revenue of various Coptic lobby groups: U.S. Copts Association: $100,000 (2010); Coptic Solidarity: $93,750 (2010); Coptic Assembly of America: $48,000 (2009); and the American Coptic Association: $22,777 (2009).  By comparison, AAA’s 2010 revenues exceeded $2 million while AIPAC’s 2007 financial revenues exceeded a staggering $70 million.